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 Presentation1
In recent decades, organisational change within political parties has 
aroused the interest of many an academic. In contrast, it has also 
encouraged the use of a wide range of theoretical approaches and, as a 
result, led to a degree of conceptual confusion. In an elaborate 
assessment, Harmel (2002) distinguishes up to three major approaches in 
the study of party change: the life cycle approach, the system level 
approach and the discrete change approach.  
On the other hand, political science has paid very little attention to the 
organisational study of political alliances. This appears to be fundamentally 
due to the fact that, as indicated in the scant theoretical work done in this 
area, the most logical situation would be for most pacts between parties to 
be ephemeral (Duverger, 1954; Panebianco, 1988). It is for this reason that 
the interest of academia has been in the study of the reasons behind their 
formation and collapse, the most common phenomena. This is the area 
where academia has shown a preference for the study of political coalitions 
and coalition governments.  
Nonetheless, it is precisely their rarity and exceptional nature that can 
turn the organisational study of alliances into small diamonds from the 
study of political parties. The first reason for this is that regardless of their 
duration, alliances between parties can be found in many parts of Europe. 
Secondly, understanding the reasons behind the formation, continuation, 
transformation and collapse of alliances is a fundamental way to best 
understand the organisational changes and dynamics found in the parties 
that make up alliances, which is precisely the objective of this article.  
Thus, the intention of this article is to develop an analytical framework 
that can be used to explain the reasons for organisational change in 
political parties that are part of political alliances. To do this, it bases its 
case on a fundamental premise: that parties are organisations and that the 
organisation analysis of pacts between them must, due to this very fact, 
precede any other analysis. On the basis of this premise, an attempt is 
made to construct an analytical framework that allows the user to: improve 
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 their knowledge of the theory of political alliances; and to make progress on 
the study of the effects of these alliances on the parties that comprise 
them, with a special focus on organisational change.  
The analytical framework proposed in this article is consistent with the 
tradition of the discrete change approach. This framework is built using the 
synthetic model for organisational change in political parties prepared by 
Panebianco (1990: chapter XIII) as a reference. This genetic model of 
organisational change is later complemented by observations of work by 
Panebianco and, in particular, with the review of the literature on the 
organisational effects of alliances in political parties. With these 
amendments, a new analytical schema is completed from which one can 
deduce four main models of organisational change in parties within political 
alliances. The second part of the article attempts to verify the explanatory 
power of each model based on the study of organisational change in Unió 
Democràtica de Catalunya within the Convergencia i Unió alliance between 
1978 and 2001.   
Alliances and organisational change: a framework for analysis 
Panebianco’s synthetic model of organisational change 
Given the compatibility of the premises with the synthetic model for 
organisational change devised by Panebianco (1988), a decision is taken 
to adopt this author’s analytical framework. Although any theoretical option 
is always a matter of opinion, in this case it would appear to be justifiable 
due to the importance placed on the work by all students of organisational 
change and the undeniable advantage of adopting the whole 
conceptualisation prepared by the author2.  
In his Political Parties: organization and power, Panebianco (1988) 
proposes two main models for change in political parties. The first, and 
more widely known of these, the model of organisational evolution 
(Panebianco, 1988: 17) links the transformations that occur between the 
different moments that give rise (genetic model) to different political parties 
and their institutionalisation. In addition to the organisational evolution of 
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 political parties from their inception to the time of their institutionalisation, 
Panebianco also devises what he calls the synthetic model of 
organisational change. The aim of this new model is to explain both the 
changes that arise out from inception to institutionalisation and the 
evolution of the party once the latter has occurred. This second model is 
the one that refers to organisational change and which is examined in the 
fourth part of the book (Figure 1)3.  
 
Figure 1 
Synthetic model of organisational change in political parties according to 
Panebianco 
Source: Panebianco (1990: 244) 
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Panebianco’s theory is that most (but not all) organisational changes 
are the products of a first interaction: the coincidence of an external 
stimulus (also enviromental challenge) with certain preconditions for 
change within the party. The external stimulus functions as a catalyst 
without which the preconditions do not react. Once this first interaction has 
taken place, a second phase begins, marked by endogenous factors: the 
dissolution of the old dominant coalition and the formation of new alliances 
that are clearly shown in a new composition of the dominant coalition. 
Finally, the third phase is characterised by a new interaction of endogenous 
factors: changes to the rules of the game and official objectives (identity) 
or, more often, to the party line. As Panebianco points out, the change in 
the configuration of the dominant coalition involve all those interactions; in 
other words, the three phases are divided purely for purposes of analysis. 
In reality, all phenomena tend to occur at the same time. This would 
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 therefore suggest that in this model, the conditions for organisational 
change involve the interaction of all factors.  
Criticisms of the model and theoretical alternatives  
Despite its importance, the choice of the Panebianco model is not 
without its difficulties and problems. Below we examine three of the main 
aspects relating to the characterisation of the dominant coalition, struggles 
for factional domination or leadership and organisational stability and, 
finally, the consequences of organisational change. 
One of the areas in which Panebianco’s work has serious limitations is 
his characterisation of the dominant coalition. On the one hand, 
Panebianco recognises the conflictive features of the dominant coalition; in 
defining the dominant coalition, he even speaks of its essentially precarious 
nature and describes it as an alliance of alliances (Panebianco, 1988: 39). 
At the same time, however, the defence given of his approach to 
organisational stability as an inherent objective of all dominant coalitions 
leads him to limit to excess the possibility of internal conflict.  
According to Panebianco, organisational stability is derived from two 
complementary rationales. From the outset, any institutionalisation of a 
party requires a process of articulating of ends for which the survival of the 
organisation becomes, in fact, the sole undisputable aim. This, in turn, 
requires debate on official aims to take a back seat to debate on the party 
line and intermediate objectives. This change in the intensity of disputes is 
conducive to organisational stability. At any rate, this does not rule out the 
possibility of debate on official aims, which generally involve serious 
identity crises and which, in turn, end up producing organisational changes 
being reopened.  
Secondly, in order to achieve power, all dominant coalitions tend to 
justify themselves with certain official aims (ideology), from which they 
deduce a party line. Since the preservation of the identity of the dominant 
coalition is in part derived from maintaining the party line, it is unlikely that 
the collation can change the party line without eroding the support behind 
the leadership (opening the door to organisational change). According to 
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 Panebianco, this argument favours a situation where all dominant coalitions 
have, in addition to the most generic objective of party survival, the 
continuation of the organisational stability as an objective (Panebianco, 
1988: 42-5). Thus, any change is seen as a potential focus of conflict to be 
avoided.   
The problem is that Panebianco uses these thoughts to arrive at a 
logical inference that is not necessarily derived from his model: since all 
dominant coalitions tend to adhere to a party line (and a number of official 
aims), Panebianco assumes that this can be reduced to a unitary actor. For 
this reason, he links organisational change to theories of entrepreneurial 
leadership, which are alien to the philosophy of his model.  The 
simplification that follows this logical inference leads Panebianco to 
hypotheses that are difficult to sustain. Perhaps the most notable is the 
assertion that the only change possible in times of crisis is the replacement 
of the whole dominant coalition by the minority elites of the party. Such an 
assumption is too determinist; it is at odds with the alliance of alliances 
nature of dominant coalitions and, in the final analysis, rules out the 
possibility (more than documented through history) of pacts between a 
party from the old dominant coalition and the minority elites.  
The solution to this problem has been to identify various sub-groups 
within the dominant coalition. In an interesting review of Panebianco’s 
work, Harmel and Janda (1994) highlight that within the dominant coalition 
a distinction can be drawn between: 1) The dominant faction, which is the 
faction that on most occasions is able to impose its criteria on the 
preparation of strategy; 2) Participative factions, factions that are integrated 
into the dominant coalition by only playing a marginal role in decision-
making; and 3) Minority elites, or factions excluded from the dominant 
coalition. This distinction by Harmel and Janda makes it possible to more 
clearly distinguish the different groups within the dominant coalition and, 
when the time comes, the possible process of reaching pacts between 
them and the minority elites4. Unlike the proposal put forward by Kitschelt 
(1989) to differentiate between lobbyists, pragmatists and ideologues, the 
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 distinction is made on organisational, not ideological criteria, given that it 
avoids conflicting with Panebianco’s main assumptions.  
Accepting that the dominant coalition is an alliance of alliances has 
notable theoretical difficulties. While a united leadership is put forward, 
organisational stability can appear (together with the very survival of the 
party) as an undisputable objective. When such leadership does not exist, 
asserting it appears to be much more questionable5. The only group that 
can be logically said to have an objective interest in organisational stability 
is the dominant faction. Depending on the circumstances, other factions 
may be more interested in promoting organisational change (in order to 
dominate the party) than in preserving stability. Thus, even when stability 
appears to have a superior status within the hierarchy to other party 
objectives, it is clear that, at certain times, certain members of the dominant 
coalition can subordinate it to other objectives.  
There are at least two dynamics not identified by Panebianco that can 
jeopardise the objective of organisational stability: a leadership crisis within 
the party, and/or a dispute between factions for internal control. Under 
these circumstances, stability can be subordinated to the need to clarify the 
internal power structure. The identification of these dynamics of struggles 
for leadership and factional domination are based on the review of 
Panebianco’s work by Harmel and Janda (1994).  
The final objection to the Panebianco model concerns the factors that 
lead to organisational change. While threats to organisational stability can 
also be produced by internal dynamics such as the struggle for leadership 
or factional domination, the possibility that organisational change can have 
essentially internal origins cannot be ruled out a priori. The fact that these 
dynamics can also occur in conjunction with changes in the internal 
environment does not mean that they must always occur together, as the 
Panebianco model suggests. A similar assessment can be found in Harmel 
and Janda (1994).  
On the other hand, even when Panebianco does not exclude other 
possibilities, his model tends to associate, as an external cause of change, 
a deterioration in the conditions of exchange with the environment identified 
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 by the author fundamentally with the electoral and parliamentary arenas 
(Panebianco, 1988: 207 and ss): an electoral defeat, the departure of the 
government, etc. Although from an intuitive perspective it is easiest to cite 
the possibility as a cause of change, as emphasised in subsequent 
literature the possibility that organisational change can also be associated 
with a substantial improvement in the conditions of exchange with the 
environment should not be ruled out6. The most appropriate approach, 
therefore, would be to refer to substantial variations (deterioration as well 
as improvements) in conditions of exchange with the environment.  
The review of the Panebianco model leads us to a new model of 
organisational change within political parties not substantially different from 
the previous model, but with specific characteristics. To summarise, the 
new model is less determinist and more open than the initial model: it 
allows change to be the result of substantial variations (positive or 
negative) in the environment, but also due to purely internal factors (the 
struggle for leadership and factionalism).  
Political alliances and their organisational effects on political 
parties7  
This section reviews the relationship established in the literature 
between the organisational dynamics associated with political alliances and 
the effects of these alliances on the parties of which they consist. This 
should allow the model for organisational change to be completed, 
adapting it to the specific characteristics of the phenomenon to be studied.  
The first definitions and classifications of pacts between parties are 
attributed to Duverger (1954). This author classifies pacts according to 
various parameters: a) Their duration, which distinguishes ephemeral 
coalitions from alliances that endure for long periods; b) the institutional 
scope involved, which distinguishes electoral, parliamentary and 
government pacts; and c) the ideology of parties within the pact. Duverger 
(1954) is also the first theorist to search for reasons for the creation and 
functioning of pacts between political parties. His hypotheses establish a 
connection between alliances and institutional factors, such as the electoral 
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 system and the party system8. Its operation depends on the 
interrelationship of institutional factors (electoral system and party system) 
with other organisational factors, such as the existence of joint institutions 
or programs, with for what Duverger is the central issue in any alliance: the 
degree of inequality between partners9.  
Duverger’s seminal contribution has been developed by two theoretical 
focuses. Curiously, each uses its own nomenclature to refer to the same 
phenomenon. Thus, the term coalition is particular to the theories of 
rational action (Riker, 1962), while the approaches more associated with 
the sociology of organisations (Panebianco, 1988) prefer to refer to 
alliances. In this way, the initial distinction made by Duverger between 
coalitions and alliances according to duration has lost its validity: both 
concepts refer to the same phenomenon, but use different theoretical 
approaches. Given that the focus of this article is based on the study of 
parties from their organisational dimension, the term political alliances will 
be used in the pages below.  
Panebianco is one of the few authors to develop the study of pacts 
between parties in its organisational dimension. Panebianco’s interest 
focuses on explaining the organisational reasons for what he calls the 
instability of political alliances. For him, what is important is not the reasons 
for which alliances are formed, but rather the organisational reasons for 
their demise or continuation over time. It is for this reason Panebianco 
points out a fundamental distinction between alliances among opponents 
and among competitors10. The reasons for this distinction are based on the 
instability that they generate in the parties that comprise them. 
Since they pose no threat to the respective hunting grounds of each 
party, pacts between opposing parties similarly do not threaten their identity 
and stability. This explains why this type of alliance tends to last. Pacts 
between competing parties, meanwhile, tend to be more unstable given 
that in the case of such pacts, there is an implicit threat to the hunting 
ground of the parties and, therefore, to their identity. In these cases, 
tensions among competitors bring instability and the subsequent collapse 
of the alliance. However, Panebianco has identified a second dynamic that 
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 can undermine the stability of alliances between competitors: the de-
instituntionalizing pressures that faces the smaller party or the party that is 
less institutionalised. For Panebianco, the solution that is sooner or later 
adopted by the smaller or less institutionalised party in the dominant 
coalition is, again, the collapse of the alliance.  
Given the inherent fragility of all alliances between competitors, it is 
important to highlight under what circumstances such alliances can be 
maintained over time. Panebianco points out the three main circumstances: 
1) the parties actually only appear to be competitors, in other words, they 
are in fact opponents; 2) the difference in size between the allies is very 
large. In this case, given that the smaller ally is incapable of attracting any 
real following on the hunting ground of the other, it does not generate 
internal instability. Furthermore, given that the survival of the smaller party 
is under serious threat from the danger posed by the larger party, this tends 
to strengthen its internal unity, in this way also favouring the stability of the 
alliance; 3) one or more of the parties are highly institutionalised. In this 
case, scant dependence on the environment and the strong control 
exercised over the hunting ground can guarantee internal stability, as well 
as the stability of the alliance.  
In spite of this, Panebianco’s emphasis on highlighting the instability 
caused by the operation of the alliance as the key factor behind the 
collapse leads him to a new logical inference: that all instability processes 
lead to collapse. It is very possible that his assertion is true on more than a 
few occasions, but it is doubtful that it will always be the case. If there are 
instability processes that do not culminate in a collapse (Figure 2), then 
Panebianco’s assumption that stability and continuation are inevitably 
associated with one another is false due to its incompleteness: alliances 
can continue with stability, but also with instability (although instability often 
leads to collapse). This results in a need to analytically separate the 
concepts of continuation and stability, which have slightly different 
meanings11.  
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 Figure 2 
Theoretical relationships between stability and maintenance in political 
alliances
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Source: Astrid Barrio and Oscar Barberà, based on Panebianco (1988) 
 
There are three fundamental difficulties when separating continuation 
and stability as independent concepts when analysing political alliances. 
The first is conceptual, the problem of distinguishing between political 
alliances and political parties, which has been present since Duverger’s 
initial work (1954). A partial, albeit interesting solution can be found in 
Eldersveld’s (1964) definition of political parties (of the masses or cath-all) 
as miniature political systems (Ramiro, 2004). The problem with a 
distinction of this type is that it can pose difficulties in much less articulated 
parties.  
The second difficulty refers to the conditions under which an alliance 
between competitors can continue despite its unstable nature. In this case, 
there are powerful arguments that can be used to justify the reasons, 
despite the process of deinstitutionalisation that all alliances give rise to in 
the weakest party(s) (Panebianco, 1988), this does not mean that 
continuation and instability have to go hand-in-hand in conceptual terms. 
Without doubt, one of the most important is the fact that in every alliance 
that lasts for a minimum period of time, complicities between the different 
groups that make up the respective dominant coalitions begin to arise.  
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 As a minimum, the creation of shared interests gives rise to two 
dynamics that can favour their continuation. Firstly, in the event of an 
internal crisis in one of the weaker parties, it could transpire that part of the 
dominant coalition of the other or other parties actively intervenes in its 
evolution (favouring one group or the other). In this case, although the 
crisis can produce instability within the alliance, the most likely outcome is 
that the result of this period of instability within the alliance is more a 
recomposition of forces rather than a collapse. If the new dominant faction 
of the weaker party owes its success to the intervention of members of the 
other party (even if it loses some of its ability to influence), it is unlikely that 
said instability will lead to the collapse of the alliance. Also, the possibility 
that the collapse of the alliance will also mean the collapse of the weakest 
party will most likely also dissuade those dominant factions to impose their 
will on other groups with external support. In these cases it is very possible 
that, in time, the alliance will become a political party with indirect affiliation 
(Figure 2).  
The third and final difficulty relates to the reasons a stable alliance may 
not last. This case is more difficult to deal with. The main reason that could 
justify the collapse of a temporarily stable alliance is that the parties that 
make up said alliance are not able to overcome the first crisis created by a 
deterioration in the process of institutionalisation or the organisational 
instability of the smaller party.  
The revision of theories on the operation of political alliances and their 
effects on organisational change within political parties suggests the need 
to integrate the alliance as a new factor in the model. This is due to the 
important interrelation foreseen by the theory between alliances and 
organisational change within political parties that make up these alliances. 
The next section seeks to establish, on the basis of the above, some 
hypotheses on the possible relationships between this and other factors 
linked to organisational change. 
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 Organisational change within political alliances: Mechanisms  
The review of Panebianco’s synthetic model of organisational change, 
as well as of his theories on the organisational effects of alliances on 
political parties has revealed the main factors to be included in our 
analytical framework. These are: variations in the parliamentary arena, the 
electoral arena, changes in the power balance within the alliance, the 
struggle for factional domination and the struggle for leadership. At the 
same time, this brief examination has shown new hypotheses that 
underline the merit of progressing towards less determinist, more open 
models. This, in turn, emerges from the characterisation of organisational 
change as a complex phenomenon. 
Under these circumstances, one of the most useful strategies that can 
arise is to identify, using what has been established in the theory, different 
alternative models of organisational change (Rihoux, 2001) and, in the 
specific case of this research, of organisational change in parties within 
political alliances. These frameworks for analysis should not be limited to 
merely providing a theoretical justification for considering each factor. The 
mechanisms through which each factor can intervene in organisational 
change should also be established in a similar manner.  
It should be pointed out that this research does not have determinist 
hopes; in other words, alternative models of organisational change are not 
ruled out. Rather, the objective is to ascertain whether or not the models 
proposed function on the basis of a case study. Despite the fact that the 
conclusions reached should be taken with caution until confirmed by 
additional data, conclusions can be used to tentatively demonstrate their 
relevance. In any case, the validity of these models should allow progress 
towards typological explanations (George and Bennet, 2005) of 
organisational change. 
Thus, the theoretical considerations prepared in the previous sections 
allow us to define a first unicausal model (model I) of organisational 
change: In this model (which brings together a set of possible routes to 
organisational change), change can occur as a result of the mere variation 
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 of one of the factors. One example of this first type of route could be, 
(simplifying) Panebianco’s synthetic model that, as we have seen, 
associates organisational changes with environmental changes.  
The second and third are most specific models of the processes of 
organisational change in political alliances. In both models, the main 
element of change is variations in power within the alliance. The 
interpretative keystone of these outlines resides in the fact that the 
influence of the alliance is the main element behind organisational change. 
The difference between the second model and the third model resides in 
the triggers (Figure 3). Whereas in the second model (model II) the origin is 
due almost exclusively to the effects of the changes in power within the 
alliance, in the third (model III) these are caused fundamentally by changes 
in the electoral or parliamentary arenas. 
 
Figure 3 
Environmental changes and organisational change in political alliances. 
Models II & III 
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In the second model, change can be triggered by at least two 
phenomena: a) the effect on the party of the particular dynamics of the 
alliance (deinstitutionalisation, threats to identity, loss of power for one or 
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 more factions); b) or crisis in one of the other parties that make up the 
alliance. In the first case, the instability generated in the party by the 
alliance can open the door to a crisis resulting from struggles for factional 
domination, leadership or all factors at the same time. It is very possible 
that in all cases, debate on the continuation of the alliance will one way or 
another come to the public’s attention. The result of the crisis would be an 
organisational change that will vary according to the initial physiognomy of 
the dominant coalition and, possibly, the collapse of the alliance. In the 
second case, the imbalance resulting from the crisis in one of the partners 
can be taken advantage of by the other members of the dominant coalition 
to strengthen their positions within and/or without the party itself. This can 
result in an internal crisis (for factional domination, leadership or both) in 
which it is very possible that momentary pacts are reached between the 
various groups of leaders of the different parties involved to shore up their 
respective positions. As we have explained, in this case the very existence 
of intra-party commitments can make organisational change possible in the 
different parties without such change affecting the continuation of the 
alliance (whilst affecting its stability).  
The third model does not differ markedly from the second except in 
terms of the trigger for the process, which is external (electoral or 
parliamentary). In this case, external factors can lead to an internal crisis in 
one of the partners (leadership crisis, split, etc.) that, as in the case above, 
gives rise to a struggle for factional power or leadership that extends to all 
of the alliance. Without reaching internal crisis in one of the parties, 
however, environmental changes can, for example, lead to new inequalities 
in the alliance that change the internal balance of power. This can be due, 
for example, to the unequal effects of a victory (or defeat) or important 
changes in the size of the partners. In these cases, changes in the balance 
of power within the alliance can lead to an internal crisis in the most 
disadvantaged party that later leads to organisational change.    
 16
 Figure 4 
Environmental changes and organisational change in political alliances. 
Model IV 
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The fourth and final model (model IV) is suggested as an alternative 
possibility to models two and three (Figure 4). In this analytical schema, it is 
thought that organisational change can occur without substantial changes 
within the alliance. In these cases, it is changes in the electoral and/or 
parliamentary scenario that begin the process of organisational change 
without causing serious internal crises or power imbalances between 
partners. Environmental changes open the door to the struggle for factional 
domination and/or internal leadership, and this leads to organisational 
change in the party. The peculiar thing is that power balances within the 
alliance do not play a role in this crisis, even when the crisis can set in train 
the process of organisational change in one or more of the other partners. 
This model is one of the internal triggers of model II and IV. 
Case study: Unió Democràtica de Catalunya within the 
Convergència i Unió alliance (1978-2001) 
Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) is a small Catalan party 
founded in 1931, shortly after the Second Republic was restored. Its 
sponsors were a group of Catholic intellectuals and politicians who 
defended the political autonomy of Catalonia and the compatibility of 
Catholicism and the values of democratic liberalism (Raguer, 1976). 
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 Heavily influenced by the thoughts and actions of Italian priest Luigi Sturzo, 
UDC designed its structure in the image of most of Europe’s nascent 
Christian Democrat parties. Even so, the party never became a numerous 
mass party. The crisis of the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War 
that followed made it impossible to develop the party. From 1936, many of 
its leaders went into exile in Catalonia. In 1939, with the beginning of the 
Franco dictatorship, the party was permanently declared illegal. During the 
dictatorship, UDC became a small party of intellectuals and university 
students that was illegal but tolerated to an extent by the regime. 
In the last years of the Franco regime, Unió activated its ties with the 
DC Internacional and made a decisive step to organise a Spanish Christian 
Democrat party (Equipo DC). Nonetheless, the appearance of the Unión de 
Centro Democrático (UCD) of the head of the Spanish government, Adolfo 
Suárez, condemned this project to failure. In the first general election of 
Spain’s political transition (1977), UDC avoided disaster but its results were 
much inferior to what the party has predicted (Tusell, 1985). This led to a 
major internal crisis. Part of the dominant faction that had historically led 
the party decided to break away and move towards Suárez’s UCD. The 
remaining members (Cañellas) had no choice but to reach a precarious 
agreement to lead the party with what was until then a minority elite (Vila 
d’Abadal). This agreement broke down when the time came to decide the 
alliance policy for the 1979 general election. While Cañellas (the sole 
parliamentarian and electoral leader) opted for a pact with Suárez’s UCD, 
the internal leaders and the intermediary structure of the party (Vila 
d’Abadal) pinned their hopes on a pact with Jordi Pujol’s Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya. Both alliances posed significant dangers, since 
the three parties competed for very similar electoral territory. The 
alternative, on the other hand, was the disappearance of the party. Finally, 
the majority of the party opted for the pact with Jordi Pujol, which led to the 
expulsion of Cañellas and the split of his followers (Barberà, 2000).  
In 1978, Unió began a new chapter in its history. Without doubt, the 
alliance with Jordi Pujol’s CDC enabled Unió to overcome its problem of 
survival. As fate would have it, just two years after it was formed the 
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 alliance between the CDC and the UDC (Convergencia i Unió, CiU) 
secured a surprise victory in the first election for the Catalan parliament 
(1980). The access of CiU to the government was a great comfort for the 
UDC. From that moment onwards, the problem of disappearance assumed 
secondary importance. Between 1980 and 1982, the party did not face any 
major problems. During these years, the UDC changed from a typical 
model of an (mass) opposition party to the requirements of a party of 
government (compatibility between leadership and public office, etc.). 
Nonetheless, this process began to gradually give rise to destabilising 
effects. The prominence of Pujol in the new Catalan government, the lack 
of an alternative leader within the UDC and the difficulties faced by the 
Christian Democrats in reaching public opinion begin to demonstrate that 
the CDC can constitute an important threat to the identity of Unió. This 
diagnosis is further aggravated by siren songs from the PDP, the newly-
founded party that had grouped together the former Christian Democrat 
faction of Suárez’s UCD since 1981 (Culla, 2000).  
 
Table 1 
Periods and factors in organisational change within the UDC (I) 
Periods 
Factors 
1977-1978 
BACKGR. 
1980-1982 1982-1986 1986-1991 1991-1993 
A. EXTERNAL 
FACTORS      
Parliamentary scenario       
a.- Catalan parliament - CiU (80-84) Rel. majority 
CiU (84-88) 
Abs. majority
CiU (88-92) 
Abs. majority
CiU (92-95) 
Abs. Majority 
b.- Congress of deputies  
UCD (77-
79) 
Consensus 
UCD (79-82) 
Rel. majority 
PSOE (82-
86) 
Abs. majority
PSOE (86-
93) 
Abs. majority
PSOE (93-
96) 
Rel. majority 
c.- Interdependent 
scenarios 
    Support from Spanish 
govt. 
 
- 
 
CiU 
 
- 
 
- 
 
CiU (93-96) 
   Support from Catalan 
govt. 
- 
 
UCD 
ERC 
ERC 
Govt. (84-87) - - 
Electoral scenario 
(Catalonia)      
a.- Direct competitors 
CDC 
UDC 
UCD 
UCD 
ERC 
CDS 
CDS 
ERC 
AP 
PDP 
CDS 
ERC 
PP 
ERC 
PP 
b.-Distance 
Large 
Unfavourabl
e for UDC 
Narrow 
(CiU-UCD) 
Favor.CiU 
Large 
Favor. CiU 
Large 
Favor. CiU 
Large 
Favor. CiU 
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 Power within CiU       
a.- Institutional 
 
- 
 
75/25(UDC) 
Local 
exception 
75/25(UDC) 
Rigol crisis 
75/25 (UDC) 
Local 
conflicts 
75/25 (UDC) 
Local 
conflicts 
b.- CDC-UDC power - Subord. UDC Subord. UDC
Reduction 
Subord. 
UDC 
Reduction 
Subord. UDC 
     CiU structure - No organic relations. 
No organic 
relations. 
Liason 
committee 
Liason 
committee 
     CiU leadership - 
Pujol 
Roca 
Coll Alentorn 
Pujol 
Roca 
Coll Alentorn 
Pujol 
Roca 
Duran 
Pujol 
Duran 
Roca 
c.- Alliance stability   - 
Stable 
(UDC crisis) 
Stable 
(UDC crisis) Stable 
Unstable 
(CDC crisis) 
Source: Barberà 
 
In mid-1982, all of these contradictions erupted into an internal crisis of 
similar or greater magnitude than that of 1977-1978. Over the course of this 
period, which lasted from 1982 to 1986, the party entered a new 
organisational phase characterised by division and internal instability. The 
dominant coalition split into two blocs, organised into factions around the 
UDC members in the Catalan government (Joan Rigol) on the one hand 
and the leadership and the intermediary and local structure on the other 
(Francesc Borrell, Josep A. Duran y Concepció Ferrer). The former argued 
in favour of the beneficial effects the alliance with the CDC, while the latter 
were critical of the scant influence of the UDC within the alliance, placing 
the blame for this at the feet of the CDC. The relatively even balance of 
power between the two camps would enable the conflict to continue for four 
years.  
At the XI Congress (1982), where the conflict first become apparent, 
the organisational management led by J.A. Duran secured a comfortable 
victory over Rigol. Nonetheless, supporters of the alliance with the CDC 
ensure that the congress rejects any rapprochement by Unió to the PDP. 
Nevertheless, Duran was unable to upset the balance of power towards the 
internal leaders: his attempt to approve an ambitious reform to the statute 
failed (XII Congress, 1983) and, in turn, he loses his battle with Jordi Pujol 
(leader of the Catalan government and the CDC) over who should appoint 
the UDC members of the Catalan government (1984). The replacement of 
Duran with Concepció Ferrer at the head of the party (XIV Congress, 1984) 
did not change the dynamic of instability and division. Despite Ferrer’s 
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 attempts at rapprochement with Rigol, this dynamic persists due to support 
from Duran (XIV and XV Congress).  Meanwhile, negotiations with the PDP 
were unsuccessful, basically due to the refusal of the Catalan branch of the 
PDP to dissolve and become part of the UDC.   
 
Table 1 
Periods and factors of organisational changes within the UDC (continued)   
Periods 
Factors 
1977-1978 
BACKGR. 
1980-1982 1982-1986 1986-1991 1991-1993 
B. INTERNAL FACTORS      
Factional division and 
struggle       
a.- Factional struggle  Yes NO Yes NO NO 
b.- Factions Cañellas Vila Abadal 
Borrell 
Rigol 
Duran 
Ferrer 
Rigol 
Duran 
Rigol 
Duran 
Rigol 
c.- Power of factions Equal Equal Equal Dominion Duran 
Dominion 
Duran 
Leadership struggle  NO NO Yes NO NO 
C. RESULTS INTENSE CHANGE 
SLOW 
CHANGE 
INTENSE 
CHANGE 
SLOW 
CHANGE 
SLOW 
CHANGE 
CD configuration Poliarchy Poliarchy Poliarchy Oligarchy Monocracy 
a.- Cohesion Division Division (2 factions) 
Division 
(3 factions) Unity Unity 
b.- Stability Unstable Stable Unstable Stable Stable 
c.- OPM 
Balance  
P.G.-O.M.  
Type 31.
Equilibrium 
O.M.-Govt. 
Type 3 
Equilibrium 
D.O.-Govt. 
Type 3 
Dominion  
O.M. 
Type 5 
Dominion 
Leader 
Type 1 
Source: Barberà. 1. Type according to Panebianco (1988: 175) 
OPM: Organisational power map. O.M.: Organisational management. P.G.: 
Parliamentary group. Govt.: Government 
Two fundamental events took place in 1986, one internal and one 
caused by external factors. Joan Rigol, the main partisan ally of the alliance 
with the CDC, had to step down from the Catalan government as a result of 
disagreements with Jordi Pujol. The other event, the new victory for the 
socialists in the 1986 general election, highlights the leadership of Fraga on 
the right, a circumstance that used by the PDP to rupture its coalition with 
the AP (Montero, 1989). The end of the coalition with the AP rekindled the 
interest of the PDP in negotiating with the UDC. Duran seized on this to 
forge a unity pact with Rigol: the UDC would reject any agreement with the 
PDP but, at the same time, demand more power from the CDC. Once the 
strategy had been agreed upon, Duran and Rigol divide up the main posts 
in the party management.  
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 The electoral hammering suffered by the PDP at the municipal 
elections of 1987 confirmed the wisdom of Duran’s strategy and facilitated 
internal pacification. After providing the impetus for significant statutory 
change (two-year mandates, more powers for the party leader, etc.), Duran 
was again UDC the party leader at the XVII Congress (1987). In this period, 
Unió was able to professionalise and modernise itself, gradually increasing 
its share of institutional power within the alliance (in particular at municipal 
level, where there is a substantial increase in conflict between the two 
parties) and increase its public prominence. All of this translated into a 
resumption of ties between the leaders of the CDC and the UDC in the 
form of a liason committee that began operating in 1988 (Culla, 2002).   
The greater weight of UDC within the alliance, the possibility that CIU 
could more actively intervene in Spanish politics and the succession of 
Pujol were behind the crisis that arose between Mr Pujol and his number 
two, Miquel Roca, between 1991 and 1993. The UDC leadership very 
skilfully took advantage of the differences within the CDC to shore up its 
position within the CIU. Indeed, Duran became the key weapon with which 
Pujol defeated Roca. This leads to Duran becoming the CiU’s virtual 
number two and, above all, permanently consolidated his leadership within 
the UDC (Antich, 1994). 
Since then, Unió has experienced a period of deep organisational 
stability that continues to this day. Neither the fact that Duran was 
marginalised from the succession of Pujol within the CiU in 2001 nor the 
departure of the CiU from the government of the Generalitat have for the 
moment changed the appearance of Unió.  
Discussion 
Despite the limited length of the case study, it seems sufficient to 
demonstrate the possible connection of each stage with one or more of the 
models specified in the analytical framework.  
Without doubt, the most remarkable aspect of the changes that took 
place between 1980 and 1982 is the paradox that organisational change 
can also go hand-in-hand with a substantial improvement in conditions of 
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 exchange with the environment: in this case, access to the government of 
Catalonia for the UDC. Undoubtedly, tracing the mechanisms of 
organisational change followed during this phase that possibly refers to a 
combination of model I and model III is more difficult. This is due to the fact 
that changes appear to originate from significant environmental changes 
and, at the same time, from the effects of these changes on the party. In 
this regard, the destabilising influence of the effects derived from 
environmental changes, changes in the balance of power within the 
alliance, changes in the map of organisational power and the organisational 
identity of Unió should be emphasised. In the final analysis, these two 
factors are responsible for the factional split within the UDC.  
From the long period of instability that ran from 1982 to 1986, a 
number of points can be made: a) the difficulty (not predicted in the model) 
of including anticipation effects and, in particular, actions more based on 
the expectations of the actors than on events; b) the events that took place 
in this period appear to refute Panebianco’s proposition that all dominant 
coalitions are united until replaced by a new minority elite; c) it should be 
pointed out that the UDC crisis at no stage affected the continuation of the 
alliance with the CDC. No doubt this is due to the role of arbitrator 
appointed by Jordi Pujol as head of the Generalitat. During this period, 
Pujol became the great guarantor of supporters within the UDC of the 
continuation of the CiU. The protection provided by Pujol allows these 
supporters to retain their influence within the party and, by extension, 
equilibrium in the struggle for factional domination. In light of these 
conditions, it is very clear that any attempt to suggest the collapse of the 
alliance would have no doubt prompted the very collapse of the party; d) 
finally, the current characteristic identity crisis within Unió Democràtica 
reveals the tensions within the dominant coalition between those for whom 
the smooth operation of the party is the priority and those for whom the 
alliance is the priority. Under these conditions, it seems reasonable to 
doubt the determinism of Panebianco once more when he states that the 
survival of the party is always an objective shared by all members of the 
dominant coalition. 
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 The organisational change that takes place between 1986 and 1991 is 
the result of a complex process that, furthermore, takes place over a long 
period of time. Firstly, the trigger is a change in the power balance between 
the different factions that is not linked to electoral or parliamentary change. 
Secondly, the long duration of the process favours a situation where there 
occurs not only an interaction between some of the different factors pointed 
out in the theoretical framework, but also between the very process of 
organisational change and these factors. The interaction effect (or 
endogeneity effect) complicates attempts to associate this transformation 
with any of the theoretical models put forward at the outset. The type of 
relationship between the different factors involved in the process is a vague 
reminder of model I; however, due to the interaction between factors it does 
not square with any of the models set out in theoretical works.  
The sequence of mechanisms associated with the most recent 
organisational change experienced within the UDC squares convincingly 
with model II. In other words, these mechanisms suggest that 
organisational change within the party is produced by changes in the 
balance of power within the alliance. The uniqueness of the process 
between 1991 and 1993 is again due to the importance of anticipation 
effects. On this occasion, the anticipation effects are related to the 
succession of Pujol and, in turn, to the possibility that the CiU could have a 
decisive role in Spain’s governability. At certain times, instability within the 
CDC seems to even threaten the continuation of the alliance. However, as 
occurred with Unió in the 1980s, instability within the alliance is not 
necessarily accompanied by its collapse. Indeed, the crisis within the CDC 
serves to give Duran and the UDC more power and prominence within the 
CiU. Finally, it confirms the importance for the continuation of the alliance 
the conjunction of interests between the different groups that comprise the 
respective dominant coalitions.  
Conclusions 
Without doubt, the most direct conclusions of this work relate to the 
refutation or, as a minimum, the weakening of some of the more 
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 determinist hypotheses of Panebianco’s synthetic model of organisational 
change. Thus, organisational change does not always involve the 
replacement of a dominant coalition with a minority elite. Two, it cannot be 
assumed that organisational stability is always the objective sought by all 
groups that make up the dominant coalition. Three, it should be 
remembered that organisational change cannot be due solely to a 
deterioration in the conditions of exchange with the surrounding 
environment. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is no reason for the 
instability of political alliances to necessarily affect their continued 
existence.  
Unlike the corrections to the Panebianco model, the verification of the 
explanatory power of the different models of organisational change 
proposed in the analytical framework is much more ambivalent. In this 
sense, the most important distinction should be made between model IV (of 
whose existence no evidence was found in this study) and models I, II and 
III which, with more or fewer nuances, seem to explain the organisational 
changes within the UDC. The distinction is important insofar as model IV 
was designed to be counterfactual to the previous models: while models I 
and III maintained that changes in power in the alliance were a necessary 
factor in explaining organisational change, model IV argued that this was 
not the case. Thus, the results appear to suggest (with the prudence and 
limitations of a case study) the importance of the alliance to understanding 
organisational change in those parties that make up said alliance. Clearly, 
future research must verify this tentative conclusion.  
The final suggestions relate to the need to integrate anticipation and 
interaction effects (endogeneity) in the model. In the first case, it advises 
that expectations in relation to events be added as another dimension of 
each factor linked to organisational change. However, this entails 
significant problems in terms of interpretation that complicate research, in 
particular since it requires what are merely interpretations of reality 
prepared by their protagonists to be constructed as social phenomena. In 
the second case, interaction between dependent and independent 
variables can be associated with the more generic concept of path 
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 dependency. However, as one can easily appreciate, nor is its inclusion in 
the model exempt from serious problems. The most significant of these 
problems in particular relates to possibilities for theoretical generalisation. 
This is due to the fact that when the evolution of a phenomenon is a 
function of its own history, it is difficult to transfer to other cases.  
In theoretical terms, signs from the UDC case appear to suggest the 
importance of moving forward towards typological explanations of 
organisational change within political parties. It is probable that such 
explanations make it possible to better understand power phenomena 
within political parties. Clearly, data gleaned from a case study should only 
be viewed in a tentative manner and as having provisional value. Future 
compared research must demonstrate the validity of each of these models 
and, possibly, suggest the existence of others not specified in this 
theoretical framework.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Òscar Barberà is Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics thanks to 
a post-doctoral scholarship from the Spanish government. 
The author wishes to thank Montserrat Baras, Astrid Barrio, Joan Rodríguez, 
Jordi Argelaguet, Joaquim Molins, Rafael Martínez and William Genieys for 
their comments. This article is part of the research program “Los partidos de 
ámbito no estatal en el sistema político español. Una perspectiva comparada 
(2006-2009)” (SEJ2006-15076-C03-02/CPOL) and of my post-doctoral 
fellowship, both of them supported by the Spanish Government. 
2. Rihoux (2001) and Harmel (2002) point out other studies within this school that 
also prepare similar models, such as those by Wilson (1980, 1994), Kitschelt 
(1989 and 1994), Harmel and Janda (1994), Harmel et. al (1995), Appelton 
and Ward (1997) and Maor (1997). To this list should be added Deschower 
(1992) and Hopkin (1999). 
3. Panebianco’s definition of organisational change is fundamentally associated 
with changes in the organisation’s authority structure (organisational order): 
“imply alterations serious enough to modify relations among the organisation’s 
various components” (Panebianco, 1988: 243). 
4. In the words of Harmel and Janda: “If the dominant coalition is factionalised, 
the dominant faction is the one most likely to get its way within the coalition. A 
participating faction is any non-dominant faction in the dominant coalition. An 
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 outside faction is any faction outside the dominant coalition” Harmel and Janda 
(1994: 274-275). A later development of the concept in Harmel and Tan 
(2003). 
5. Doubts can even arise as to whether the very survival of the party can be 
considered an objective. Hirschman (1970) theorised about this possibility, 
which has been successfully used to explain crises that bring about the 
organisation itself. A good example in the work by Hopkin (1999) on the 
Spanish UCD. 
6. See works by Harmel and Janda (1994), Harmel et al. (1995) and Rihoux 
(2001) on green parties in Europe. 
7. Many of the ideas contained in this section are also credited to Astrid Barrio, to 
whom I extend my thanks for her permission to use them as she completes her 
doctoral thesis.   
8. According to the Duverger schema, both factors (the electoral system and the 
party system) come together so that in majority-based electoral systems, the 
determining factor appears to be the number of parties in the political system, 
while in proportional multiparty systems the influence of proportionality tends to 
encourage unstable alliances (Duverger, 1954: 343 y ss.).  
9. Duverger ties in the concept of inequality with three dimensions: Dimension, 
which refers to size; the ideology, which refers to the ideological position of the 
allies and, specifically, the extent of the moderation-extremism; and the 
structure, which refers primarily to the number of parties that make up the 
alliance (Duverger, 1954: 344 and ss.).  
10. Parties that act in the same political hunting ground are rivals. There is 
opposition but no competition when hunting grounds of the two parties do not 
overlap. (Panebianco, 1988: 215-6).  
11. While maintenance (or durability) refers to the duration of a phenomenon, 
stability is associated with the conflictive or non-conflictive nature of said 
phenomenon. 
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